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Statements to Congress 
Statement by Paul A. Volcker, Chairman, Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
before the Subcommittee on Domestic Monetary 
Policy of the Committee on Banking, Finance 
and Urban Affairs, U.S. House of Representa-
tives, October 18, 1983. 
I appreciate this opportunity to give the views of 
the Federal Reserve Board on a number of bills 
of importance for the structure and functioning 
of the Federal Reserve. Two bills, which I will be 
discussing together, would add three directors 
representing thrift institutions to the boards of 
directors of the Federal Reserve Banks and 
would provide for the retirement of Federal 
Reserve stock now held by the member banks. 
The third bill, called "The Federal Reserve Mod-
ernization Act," includes a provision for the 
compilation and publication of detailed minutes 
of Federal Open Market Committee meetings, 
addresses several issues regarding the office of 
Chairman, and also covers some housekeeping 
matters. 
THRIFT DIRECTORS AND FEDERAL RESERVE 
STOCK 
Both H.R. 3868 and H.R. 3869 address some 
issues that have been raised because the relation-
ship of the Federal Reserve to depository institu-
tions has been changed as a result of the Mone-
tary Control Act of 1980. That act applied 
reserve requirements to all depository institu-
tions over a certain size and made Federal Re-
serve credit and services available to these insti-
tutions as well. However, certain distinctions 
remain between member banks and other deposi-
tory institutions; only member banks are super-
vised by the Federal Reserve, own stock in the 
Federal Reserve Banks, participate in the elec-
tion of Reserve Bank directors, and are assured 
of representation on the board of directors of the 
head offices. Moreover, only institutions that are 
eligible for FDIC (Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation) insurance can be members; thus, 
under current law, savings and loans and credit 
unions may not apply for membership. 
Recognizing the need to broaden contacts be-
tween the Federal Reserve and the thrift industry 
after passage of the Monetary Control Act, the 
Board established a Thrift Institutions Advisory 
Council, with members from each of the types of 
institutions mentioned in H.R. 3868—that is, 
savings and loan associations, savings banks, 
and credit unions. This council meets with the 
Board quarterly—as does the statutory Federal 
Advisory Council, whose members are commer-
cial bankers—to discuss a variety of issues of 
mutual concern. In addition, the Federal Reserve 
Banks have also made an effort to enhance 
interactions with thrift institutions. They have 
appointed thrift industry participants to the 
boards of 11 of our 25 Reserve Bank branches. 
They have also established mechanisms—such 
as industry advisory committees—for more 
effective mutual communication with the thrift 
institutions in their Districts. 
The Board shares the objective of adding to 
the head-office boards of the Federal Reserve 
Banks individuals with direct and current experi-
ence in the thrift industry. But we believe that 
objective should and can be accomplished with-
out establishing a new class of three directors 
composed entirely of thrift institution represen-
tatives. 
Several considerations of the appropriate bal-
ance and size of Reserve Bank boards are rele-
vant to that conclusion. H.R. 3868 would sub-
stantially increase the size of the board of 
directors, but entirely through new thrift repre-
sentatives. This approach would not assist our 
efforts to broaden the boards in other direc-
tions—for example, by adding directors with 
background in smaller businesses, consumer and 
community affairs, and labor. There is also an 
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apparent anomaly in the proposed legislation 
because it would not permit the Board of Gover-
nors to select directors from among the 8,000 
nonmember banks, even though these banks are 
subject to the same reserve requirements and 
have the same access to System services as the 
thrifts (and actually keep more reserves and use 
more services). Moreover, those commercial 
banks often have an additional relationship with 
the Federal Reserve through our regulation of 
their holding companies. 
A more technical deficiency in the proposal is 
that it requires a representative of a savings and 
loan, a savings bank, and a credit union on the 
Board of every District Bank, with no attention 
to the differing importance of those institutions in 
various regions of the country. I would also point 
out that member banks, which are required to 
purchase Federal Reserve stock on which a 
dividend of only 6 percent is paid and which are 
directly supervised by the Federal Reserve, elect 
three bankers, the same number as proposed for 
the thrifts. 
As the last point implies, a whole new class of 
directors, selected from among thrift institutions, 
would inevitably raise more general questions 
about the organization of the Federal Reserve 
and the nature of voting rights of Reserve Bank 
stock. As you know, present arrangements for 
stock ownership in the Federal Reserve and for 
selection of Federal Reserve Bank Directors do 
not confer control over policy to the stockhold-
ers or to the Bank Directors. Federal Reserve 
policy is determined by public officials acting, 
under the law, wholly in the public interest. But 
stock ownership and local boards have implica-
tions for the entire regional and independent 
structure of the Federal Reserve System. From 
the standpoint of banks, the opportunity to join 
the Federal Reserve System allows a bank some 
latitude in its choice of a primary federal regula-
tor and provides an institutional basis for com-
municating with the System. From the stand-
point of the organization of the System, local 
directors chosen locally help assure the stature 
and identity of regional Federal Reserve Bank 
officials in the decisionmaking process, while at 
the same time providing for active review and 
surveillance of regional operations. By providing 
for technical ownership of the System insulated 
from political control, present stockholding ar-
rangements help assure the independent role of 
the Federal Reserve within government. 
We would be glad to review in greater depth 
the proper role of stock ownership in the struc-
ture of the Federal Reserve System with the 
subcommittee. We believe it would be appropri-
ate to embark on changes in this area only after 
considerable deliberation and careful study. 
Questions concerning Reserve Bank stock need 
not be raised by other steps that could and 
should be taken to achieve a broader composi-
tion of the boards of the regional Reserve Banks. 
Specifically, the Board recommends that you 
provide for expansion of the present Class C 
directors from three to five and for the inclusion 
of nonmember depository institutions specifical-
ly among the various groups that should be 
considered in choosing such directors. Class C 
directors are appointed by the Board of Gover-
nors, and such a provision would enable the 
Board to broaden representation on the boards 
while keeping them to an effective, workable 
size. We would undertake normally to provide 
that one Class C director at each Federal Re-
serve Bank be drawn from the thrift industry, 
and that among the 12 Banks the directors would 
include individuals with savings and loan, sav-
ings bank, and credit union backgrounds. We 
would also continue to encourage the service of 
thrift industry participants on Branch boards. 
I believe this proposal would further assure 
that the interests of thrift institutions would be 
fully taken into account in the deliberations of 
the Reserve Bank boards. At the same time, it 
would also make possible choices from a greater 
range of backgrounds in appointing Class C 
directors generally. We agree with numerous 
comments in both the House and Senate in the 
past that directors should adequately reflect the 
diversity of the American economy and society, 
and a larger number of Class C directors would 
help achieve that result. 
FEDERAL RESERVE MODERNIZATION ACT 
The Federal Reserve supports the passage of 
H.R. 4009, the Federal Reserve Modernization 
Act. 
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Detailed FOMC Minutes 
One section of that bill would require that de-
tailed minutes be maintained for all meetings of 
the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) 
and that these minutes be made available to the 
public on a deferred basis. The Federal Reserve 
already provides the public with a great deal of 
information on FOMC policy decisions. The 
Record of Policy Actions prepared for each 
meeting includes a summary of the views ex-
pressed by Committee members on economic 
developments and on monetary policy, including 
any divergent views, and records all the votes on 
monetary policy actions. Information on mone-
tary policy is also provided to the Congress and 
to the public through the Board's semiannual 
reports under the Humphrey-Hawkins Act and 
through frequent testimony before congressional 
committees. 
H.R. 4009 would supplement the information 
now released primarily by requiring that the 
decisions and debate be recorded in full, and that 
the views expressed by any member of the 
FOMC be attributed to that member. In our 
judgment, the detailed minutes in question would 
not add substantively to the information now 
being made available to the public about the 
nature of our policy decisions, but the Board 
understands the desire to establish a more de-
tailed record that might be of future interest to 
historians, economists, and other close students 
of monetary policy. Accordingly, the Board has 
no objection to the preparation and eventual 
release of such minutes provided a suitable peri-
od of time has elapsed. 
We believe such a time period is essential to 
preserve the confidentiality and spontaneity of 
the deliberations. The provisions of H.R. 4009 
make clear that no portion of the minutes may 
legally be released before a specified minimum 
period of approximately four years after the 
calendar year in which the meeting occurred and 
provide for the withholding of references to 
sensitive international financial developments 
for additional periods. A minimum time period of 
that length is necessary to avoid inhibiting the 
frank exchange of views during policy discus-
sions and the risk of politicizing the decisionmak-
ing process. 
Occasionally there are particular sensitivities 
in the international financial area, in which pre-
mature release of information on ongoing negoti-
ations and on the views and operations of foreign 
governments could have an adverse impact on 
the ability of the Federal Reserve to act in an 
atmosphere of mutual confidentiality and trust 
with foreign countries. The provisions of the bill 
to deal with this contingency seem to us ade-
quate and appropriate. 
Proposals Regarding Appointment of the 
Chairman 
The Board believes there is merit in providing for 
a consistent relationship between the term of the 
Chairman of the Federal Reserve with the term 
of the President. At present, the beginning of a 
Chairman's term is an accident of history—a 
product of the timing of previous appointments, 
resignations, and expirations of the term of a 
Chairman as a member of the Board of Gover-
nors. The principal problem with the present 
arrangement is that a new four-year appointment 
might be required late in a presidential term or in 
the midst of, or shortly after, a contentious 
political campaign, tending to bring the choice 
into the heat of the political contest. 
It is difficult to argue that there is a single 
optimal alignment of the two terms, but among 
the possibilities there is a sound basis for making 
the four-year term of the Chairman begin on 
February 1 of the year after the President's term 
of office commences, as proposed in H.R. 4009. 
Such an alignment would permit a President to 
nominate a Chairman relatively early in his term, 
but at a point in time somewhat removed from 
the series of political appointments required at 
the very start of a new administration. Continu-
ity at the central bank in the midst of a transition 
of administrations would be especially desirable. 
Moreover, the proposed date has a technical 
advantage in that the expiration of the Chair-
man's term would coincide with the expiration of 
the term of a member of the Board of Governors, 
so there would be no question of an opening on 
the Board for a new appointment. 
To avoid the possibility of appointment for a 
short, unexpired portion of a term, a provision 
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could be added to the proposed legislation that, 
in the event of an opening within the year after 
the inauguration of a President, the term of the 
new Chairman would encompass both the re-
maining months of the current term and the next 
regular four-year term. 
Another provision of the proposed legislation 
would assure that a President would not be 
constrained in his choice of Chairman by the 
geographic restriction applicable to other gover-
nors. Specifically, the restriction that no two 
members of the Board of Governors may be 
selected from the same Federal Reserve District 
would be lifted in the case of the appointment of 
a Chairman. The Board supports this "at large" 
appointment of the Chairman on the grounds that 
the President should be permitted to select the 
most qualified individual for the position. 
The proposed legislation also (1) authorizes 
the Vice Chairman to act as Chairman in the 
event of the unavailability of the Chairman or, in 
the event of a vacancy, pending the appointment 
and confirmation of a successor; and (2) clarifies 
that the Chairman or Vice Chairman shall contin-
ue to serve in that capacity after expiration of his 
or her term until a successor is confirmed. The 
Board supports these amendments to the Federal 
Reserve Act. The act currently makes no clear 
provision for the former situation and contains 
an ambiguity with regard to the latter by allowing 
Board members to continue serving until their 
successor is confirmed without specifying their 
continuation as Chairman or Vice Chairman 
per se. 
Federal Reserve Bank Branches 
Finally, the Board also supports the removal of 
the limit on the cumulative dollar amount that 
may be spent on the construction of Federal 
Reserve branch buildings. The current limita-
tion—last amended in 1974 to bring it to a 
cumulative total of $140 million—will be ex-
hausted by projects that are under way and 
currently in an advanced planning stage. We 
have established a process that requires Board 
approval at each of several stages of every 
building program of the Reserve Banks to assure 
that the space needs are projected appropriately, 
that alternative approaches are evaluated thor-
oughly, and that construction costs are well 
controlled. The lack of authorization for further 
funding introduces unnecessary difficulties to the 
construction and planning processes. In short, 
retention of the current limitation could impede 
the efficiency of System operations. • 
Statement by Paul A. Volcker, Chairman, Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
before the Joint Economic Committee, October 
20, 1983. 
I am pleased to have the opportunity to meet 
with this committee to discuss the current eco-
nomic situation. As you know, the Federal Re-
serve's most recent official monetary policy re-
port was submitted to the Congress in mid-July.
1 
Because that report treated the economic situa-
tion in considerable detail, my remarks on the 
current economic and financial situation will be 
limited mainly to an updating. More importantly, 
I also would like to reemphasize a number of 
concerns that I expressed at the time that the 
midyear report was submitted to the Congress. 
1. "Monetary Policy Report to the Congress," FEDERAL 
RESERVE BULLETIN, vol. 69 (August 1983), pp. 579-90. 
At that time, it was evident that the current 
economic recovery had gained considerable mo-
mentum and was following in many respects a 
typical cyclical pattern. Advances in residential 
construction had been large; consumer spending 
had registered exceptional increases in the 
spring; and business investment spending also 
was beginning to strengthen. Employment gains 
were substantial through the first half, and the 
unemployment rate—though still high—had 
moved steadily lower. By midyear, only the 
export sector remained a major depressant on 
the growth of real gross national product, reflect-
ing the further widening of this country's foreign 
trade deficit. 
By and large, the economic trends evident at 
midyear have continued through the third quar-
ter. Industrial production has continued rising at 
a rapid pace through September. Payroll employ-
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ment increased nearly two-thirds of a million 
during the three months ending in September, 
and the unemployment rate fell three-fourths of a 
percentage point over that same period. Prelimi-
nary indications suggest that growth in real GNP 
remained fairly close to the exceptionally high 
rate of the second quarter. On the whole, I 
believe that the data indicate that the economy 
remains firmly on the path of expansion. 
Moreover, the recent price information contin-
ues to underscore the gains made against infla-
tion over the past two or three years. During the 
first eight months of 1983, the consumer price 
index rose at about a V/i percent annual rate, 
somewhat less than the rate achieved in 1982, 
and the producer price index, on balance, has 
showed virtually no change over that same peri-
od. This price information is better than we have 
experienced in a decade or more, in sharp con-
trast to the racheting upward of prices in the 
1970s. 
Because labor inputs account for about two-
thirds of total GNP, an easing in growth of labor 
costs is crucial if our gains against inflation are to 
prove sustainable. On this score, we have made 
further progress so far this year. The rate of 
increase in nominal wage gains has trended 
downward; the hourly earnings index, the most 
current wage measure, has risen at a rate of less 
than 4 percent this year. The easing of cost 
pressures has been reinforced by rapid produc-
tivity gains that appear to reflect not only the 
cyclical gains normally associated with the early 
stages of expansion, but also some apparent 
improvement in the trend rate of productivity 
growth. It is this kind of pattern, if sustained, 
that can keep the underlying inflation rate mov-
ing lower—and real wages rising. 
Overall, these recent indicators of economic 
activity, inflation, and productivity provide a 
strong start toward a much more satisfactory 
economic performance than we have seen for 
many years. At the same time, as I have said 
many times before, what counts is not the rate of 
economic growth over a short time span of a few 
months, or even a few quarters, but rather the 
performance of the economy over time. The 
current expansion, though more robust than gen-
erally expected at the beginning of the year, still 
is less than a year old. And, on the surface, it 
could be said that recent events do not differ 
dramatically from the early phases of some earli-
er business cycles that also began with strong 
growth and improved price performance—but 
later deteriorated into accelerating inflation and 
stagnating real activity. That past record should 
be warning enough to resist any temptation to sit 
back and let events take their course, hoping that 
the momentum of expansion and the progress 
already made against inflation will be sustained 
pretty much on their own. 
Moreover, there are obvious potential obsta-
cles in the path to sustained progress. Most 
importantly, the current prospect that federal 
budget deficits will remain exceptionally large 
into the indefinite future is a major factor prop-
ping up interest rates and continues to pose a 
serious risk to the stability of financial markets in 
the future, threatening the balance and ultimate 
sustainability of the recovery itself. The econom-
ic and financial problems of many developing 
countries—aggravated by the high level of dollar 
interest rates—remain a dark cloud over the 
international financial system, and unless con-
tained, could jeopardize our own economy. And, 
despite our substantial progress against inflation, 
doubts about the sustainability of that process, 
and temptations to revert to attitudes and behav-
ior characteristic of the 1970s, could undermine 
prospects for continuing economic expansion. In 
these respects, we are in a period of testing. 
It is well within our capacity to pass these 
tests. But it will take a positive approach, not a 
wait-and-see attitude. Data for the past fiscal 
year provide some sense of the budgetary prob-
lem; in fiscal 1983 the federal budget deficit, not 
counting Treasury financing of off-budget pro-
grams, apparently reached almost $200 billion, 
nearly twice the previous year's deficit, which 
itself had been of record proportions. The 1983 
federal deficit amounted to about 6V2 percent of 
nominal GNP: before 1983, there had been only 
one year in the past three decades in which 
federal deficits were as much as 4 percent of 
GNP. 
Obviously, the magnitude of the federal deficit 
in future years will depend on both the actions of 
the Congress and on the strength of the economic 
recovery. A large portion of the 1983 deficit— 
perhaps half—reflected the influence of the busi-
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ness cycle on federal receipts and expenditures. 
As the economy improves, this "cyclical" ele-
ment in the deficit will become smaller. 
But given current legislation, the noncyclical, 
or "structural" part of the deficit is all too likely 
to rise further. Indeed, under even the most 
optimistic economic assumptions now being 
made, the federal deficit appears likely to remain 
at levels, relative to the size of the economy, that 
are without historical precedent during periods 
of economic expansion. 
A year ago there appeared to be a growing 
commitment in the Congress to address the prob-
lems associated with federal deficits. Today, I 
fear the sense of urgency has dissipated. Instead, 
with the economy growing again, there may be a 
temptation to try to live with historically unprec-
edented peacetime deficits. 
That course implies great hazards. Even in the 
period just completed—during which private 
credit growth was reduced substantially by the 
recession—the influence of heavy federal bor-
rowing contributed to the persistence of high 
interest rates. Maintaining large deficits in com-
ing years makes it far more likely that interest 
rates will remain historically high well into the 
recovery, posing a risk to the sustainability of the 
expansion. 
The progress we have made against inflation— 
if sustained—is one fundamental force that 
should tend to make interest rates lower over 
time. But the huge budget deficits have an impact 
in the opposite direction. One result is to dampen 
prospects for business investment, particularly 
for long-lived investment with relatively slower 
"pay-out." But that investment is what is need-
ed to revitalize some of our basic industries and 
to support productivity generally. 
Some of those same industries also suffer from 
depressed exports or strong import competition. 
To the extent that large capital inflows are in-
duced by pressures on our domestic capital and 
credit markets, those inflows have contributed to 
maintaining the dollar at "artificially" high lev-
els, viewed from the perspective of the current 
competitive position of our industry. In the short 
run, those capital inflows may help to moderate 
pressures on the financial markets. But, viewed 
in a longer perspective, we have the irony of the 
largest and richest country in the world in effect 
turning to foreign investors to help finance its 
government deficits, while, by the same process, 
draining vitality from the firms and industries 
that in the past have been important exporters. 
As I noted earlier, exports have been a weak 
element in the business picture, and our trade 
and current account deficits are growing toward 
levels that would be unsustainably large. The 
longer that process lasts, the greater the potential 
instability for the U.S. and for the world 
economy. 
The persistence of large federal deficits and 
high interest rates also complicates the efforts to 
deal with the international debt situation. The 
developing countries—excluding those that are 
members of the Organization of Petroleum Ex-
porting Countries—have a total indebtedness of 
about $575 billion. Of that total, about $285 
billion is owed to banks around the world, with 
more than $100 billion owed to U.S. banks. The 
level of indebtedness is high relative to the 
current income-generating potential of those 
economies, and the great bulk of the debt is in 
dollars, paying dollar interest rates. As you 
know, difficulties in servicing these debts have 
been widespread. 
Thus far, problems have been contained 
through an extraordinary degree of cooperation 
among borrowers, private creditors, national au-
thorities, and international organizations. The 
borrowing nations themselves have undertaken 
strong adjustment measures to restore financial 
stability, increase debt-servicing capacity, and 
improve their creditworthiness. There also has 
been a major cooperative effort among the lend-
ing banks to agree upon financing programs 
involving the restructuring of existing debts and 
provision of some new loans. 
At the center of this process have been the 
coordinating efforts of the International Mone-
tary Fund (IMF). On several previous occasions 
when I have testified before the Congress, I have 
urged prompt action to bolster the resources of 
the IMF. However, as you know, the work on 
that important legislation has not been complet-
ed. 
International understandings look toward ac-
tion before the end of next month, so time is 
growing short. Apart from the actual funds in-
volved, our failure, alone among nations, to 
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participate in this effort would send a strong 
message around the world that we do not support 
the cooperative efforts to manage and contain the 
debt problems of the developing countries. Put 
positively, participating in the proposed increase 
in IMF resources is a necessary and prudent 
investment in our own future. 
Another important element in dealing with the 
current external financing problems of develop-
ing countries is a concerted effort to maintain the 
flow of bank credit to these countries. The 
question is sometimes raised as to whether such 
lending will be at the expense of lending to 
domestic borrowers and the expansion of our 
own economy. In that connection, I would em-
phasize the new bank lending to these countries 
will, in the aggregate, be at a substantially re-
duced pace from that of recent years, and as I 
have noted, on balance we are currently large net 
borrowers from the rest of the world. In the 
absence of these cooperative lending efforts by 
banks and the IMF, I do not believe we could be 
successful in avoiding widespread defaults or 
worse. The clear threat would be that such an 
international financial disturbance would have 
major repercussions on our own credit markets, 
our interest rates, and our growth prospects—far 
outweighing any effects on our markets of the 
limited foreign lending required to maintain sta-
bility internationally. 
Finally, I must emphasize the crucial impor-
tance of maintaining the progress against infla-
tion. As I noted earlier, looking back, the recent 
data on prices and wages are favorable. Howev-
er, it is also true that for a while some temporary 
factors caused measured rates of inflation to 
exaggerate the slowdown in underlying rates of 
inflation. As the temporary factors have subsid-
ed, there has been some increase in reported 
monthly rates of increase in prices from the 
essentially flat record of the first half. That is 
not, in itself, surprising, but it does warn against 
any sense of complacency. 
The fact is that there continue to be deep-
seated concerns both in financial markets and 
among the general public that more strongly 
inflationary trends could soon resume. The expe-
rience of the 1970s with accelerating inflation, 
despite some cyclical "pauses," is still deeply 
ingrained in people's minds, and, looking ahead, 
there is concern about whether appropriate re-
straint of money and credit growth will be main-
tained in the face of sustained huge deficits. 
There are strong grounds for believing that 
these attitudes and expectations may be lagging 
behind reality and that underlying inflation rates 
are lower—and can continue to move lower— 
than is generally perceived. Indeed, with the 
period of low inflation still lengthening, with 
spare capacity still extensive in many sectors, 
with strong domestic and international competi-
tion, and with labor amply available, there is a 
rare opportunity to "build in" greater stability. 
Whether that optimistic view will, in the end, 
prove correct depends, in part, on the attitudes 
and behavior of business and labor. We currently 
see strong efforts to contain costs and improve 
efficiency in industries subject to the most in-
tense competitive pressure, whether because of 
depressed markets or other factors. In some 
other areas, new wage contracts or pricing poli-
cies appear to be out of touch, both with our 
recent experience with inflation and with current 
conditions in labor or product markets generally. 
Rather, we see symptoms of a kind of car-
ryover—or a "hangover"—of attitudes instilled 
in a more inflationary environment. Should those 
attitudes be reinforced and generally prevail, our 
effort to move toward sustainable economic 
growth with greater stability would be greatly 
complicated. 
Experience suggests that expectations devel-
oped over a lengthy period of accelerating infla-
tion are rarely changed suddenly. But they will 
change over time, so long as public policy re-
mains steadfast in its commitment to an environ-
ment of greater price stability. 
Monetary policy inevitably must play a central 
role in that process, essentially by containing 
growth of money and credit to amounts consis-
tent with containing inflation over time. I doubt 
that such efforts can ever be reduced, in a 
complex, changing economy like ours, to a sim-
ple mechanical formula to govern growth in one 
measure of the money supply or another. For 
instance, in the midst of both institutional and 
economic change last year and during the early 
part of 1983, the Federal Reserve accommodated 
faster growth in some of the various monetary 
aggregates than it had planned earlier, respond-
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ing in part to the visible evidence of a pro-
nounced slowdown in the turnover, or "veloci-
ty," of money. With some indications that more 
normal patterns may be returning, and with the 
momentum of recovery strong, limited steps 
were taken to resist monetary and credit growth 
during the spring and early summer. In a real 
sense, in a climate sensitive to inflation and the 
possible future inflationary implications of cur-
rent policy, timely steps to preempt excesses can 
avert the need for much stronger action later. 
In recent weeks, all the monetary and credit 
aggregates have moved comfortably within the 
target ranges, easing concerns of a surge in liquid-
ity growth. Also, interest rates, for the most part, 
have edged slightly lower in recent weeks, follow-
ing moderate increases in late spring and early 
summer. But the looming budget deficits remain as 
a focus for doubts about the future. 
In conclusion, the economic situation, in its 
broadest terms, does not differ dramatically from 
the situation that was apparent at midyear. Cur-
rent economic indicators have continued to show 
a strongly growing economy coupled with only 
moderate rates of inflation. At the same time, 
concerns about the longer-run outlook that were 
apparent at midyear are still with us today. Now, 
as then, we broadly know what policies are 
needed to provide greater assurance of sustained 
economic growth and lasting price stability. 
What remains to be done is to implement those 
policies. • 
Statement by J. Charles Partee, Member, Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
before the Subcommittee on Financial Institu-
tions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of 
the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban 
Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, October 
27, 1983. 
I appreciate this opportunity to give the views of 
the Federal Reserve Board on proposals to per-
mit the payment of interest on demand deposits. 
The Board supports repeal of the existing prohi-
bition on interest payments on demand deposits. 
We believe that such a step is appropriate at this 
time in light of the vast changes in banking and 
financial markets over the past 50 years, and that 
the benefits in terms of enhanced return to some 
depositors and a more efficient use of our na-
tion's resources will outweigh the temporarily 
adverse effects on bank profits. 
The Congress has already recognized the dis-
tortion and inequity inherent in interest rate 
ceilings on time, savings, and household transac-
tion accounts, and in accord with its congres-
sional mandate, the Depository Institutions 
Deregulation Committee (DIDC) has eliminated 
ceilings on the great bulk of such deposits. Many 
of the same arguments apply to the prohibition of 
interest on demand deposits, and the repeal of 
this prohibition would complete the process of 
rate ceiling deregulation. As I will explain later, 
however, we do have some differences with you, 
Mr. Chairman, on the details of how to imple-
ment the repeal. In addition, we believe it would 
be desirable to couple a move in this direction 
with action to begin paying interest on required 
reserve balances held at Federal Reserve Banks. 
Finally, as you requested, I will discuss issues 
associated with brokered deposits. 
HISTORY AND CURRENT IMPACT OF 
PROHIBITING INTEREST ON DEMAND 
DEPOSITS 
The prohibition of the payment of interest on 
demand deposits was first put in place 50 years 
ago in the midst of the banking crisis that accom-
panied the deepening economic depression. 
Banks that were members of the Federal Reserve 
System were banned from paying interest on 
demand deposits in 1933 and this prohibition was 
extended to insured nonmember banks in 1935 
(and to savings and loan associations in 1982 
when they were first authorized to offer demand 
deposits). The payment of interest on demand 
balances was thought to have contributed to the 
Great Depression in two ways. First, it allowed 
large city banks to bid funds away from rural 
areas, primarily through the medium of "bankers 
balances" or deposits of smaller banks in larger 
ones. This flow, it was believed, not only drained 
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credit from agriculture and small-town busi-
nesses, but also tended to foster speculative 
excesses in securities markets because the large 
banks allegedly were using the funds to make 
loans to stock purchasers buying on margin. 
Second, the unregulated payment of interest on 
demand and other deposits was felt to have 
contributed to the weakened condition of the 
banking system. Excessive competition for funds 
on a rate basis was thought to encourage banks 
to generate needed revenue by making riskier 
loans on which subsequent defaults led to bank 
failures. In addition, prohibiting interest on de-
mand deposits was intended to reduce costs so 
that banks could more easily afford the premiums 
on newly introduced deposit insurance. 
With the benefit of historical hindsight, we can 
now see that some of the reasons given for 
prohibiting interest payments on demand depos-
its might not have been so compelling as they 
seemed at the time. Bankers balances, or a close 
substitute for them, would have been held in any 
case, because they served a number of useful 
functions to smaller, rural banks, including pro-
viding a source of liquidity to meet seasonal 
swings in loans and deposits and facilitating 
check-clearing and other services received from 
the larger banks. With respect to the effect of 
interest rate competition, any related deteriora-
tion in credit-underwriting standards was 
swamped by general financial and economic 
events, so that subsequent studies fail to show an 
association between rates paid on deposits and 
the incidence of bank failure during the period. 
I would note also that the prohibition of inter-
est rates on demand deposits has not prevented 
the emergence of close, interest-bearing substi-
tutes whose use has greatly eroded whatever 
effectiveness rate limitations once had. Large 
account holders, including business corporations 
and others, long ago began utilizing a variety of 
instruments and techniques enabling them to 
minimize the impact of the inability to earn 
interest on demand deposit balances. In 1980 the 
Congress authorized the nationwide availability 
of interest-bearing transaction accounts for 
households and nonprofit organizations and, in 
1982, for governmental bodies. 
Certainly, the absence of interest on demand 
deposits has not inhibited the flow of funds from 
one area of the country to another. The federal 
funds market provides an efficient way for banks 
with surplus funds—often smaller institutions— 
to make them available at market-determined 
rates to banks with funding needs—often those 
located in money centers. Money center banks 
have come up with a variety of other instruments 
as well that allow them to bid for large volumes 
of funds in what is in effect an interregional— 
indeed, an international—dollar market. 
In addition, for many banks the prohibition of 
interest on demand deposits probably has not 
significantly held down the overall cost of fund-
ing. Customers, working with banks, have devel-
oped sophisticated cash management techniques 
that minimize the volume of balances in demand 
accounts by moving funds on a short-term basis 
between demand deposits and highly liquid in-
struments paying market yields. Some instru-
ments, such as money market deposit accounts 
and money market funds, can even be substitut-
ed to a limited extent directly for demand depos-
its in making transactions; others, including re-
purchase agreements and Eurodollar deposits, 
can be acquired for periods as short as overnight 
to earn interest on surplus balances. Although 
these techniques were developed initially by and 
for large corporations, in an environment of high 
interest rates and improving technology, they 
have increasingly become available to smaller 
customers as well. 
Moreover, the balances remaining in demand 
deposit accounts are by no means "free" to the 
bank. Rather, in exchange for those balances the 
bank provides a variety of services to demand 
deposit holders, charging considerably less than 
their cost. In this way, depositors earn "implic-
it" interest on their funds in demand deposits. 
These services include check clearing, deposit 
processing, and other transactions associated 
directly with the use of the demand account 
itself, and they may involve other banking func-
tions, such as loan commitments, wire transfers, 
processing credit card drafts, and payroll prepa-
ration. Banks commonly inform businesses hold-
ing demand deposits what level of balances they 
must hold so that the bank's earnings from the 
zero-interest balances cover the expense of pro-
viding the services. 
When businesses use cash management tech-
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niques to keep their balances to the minimums 
set by the banks, the implicit interest return to 
the holder probably about matches the market-
determined interest rate that would be paid, and 
the prohibition of interest on demand deposits 
offers no cost savings to banks. However, many 
smaller businesses and households still holding 
demand deposits may not have the expertise or 
time available to manage their demand accounts 
that closely. These account holders are earning 
some implicit interest from the services they 
receive, but that compensation is likely to be 
below competitive interest rates, especially for 
holders of relatively large, inactive accounts. 
THE EFFECT OF ALLOWING INTEREST 
TO BE PAID ON DEMAND DEPOSITS 
Repeal of the prohibition of interest on demand 
deposits will affect the banking business in a 
number of important ways. In general, banks will 
probably move more rapidly to explicit pricing of 
the services they offer customers and away from 
asking for low- or no-interest compensating bal-
ances. Interest rates on the various types of 
deposits available at banks and thrift institutions 
are likely to depend primarily on the maturity of 
the deposit rather than on what the deposit is 
used for. Just how this process will evolve and 
precisely what its effects might be cannot be 
predicted with confidence, but some broad out-
lines can be discerned. 
Some bank customers will stand to benefit, 
especially those holding higher demand balances 
than needed to compensate for the services they 
are now receiving. As I indicated before, the 
most important class of such customers probably 
is small to medium-sized businesses. They will 
be able to realize a return on transaction bal-
ances without the expenditure of time and money 
to learn about and utilize sophisticated cash 
management techniques. Those already employ-
ing such techniques will be free to redirect re-
sources into more productive uses, since inter-
est-earning demand accounts could provide a 
direct and competitive outlet for holding liquid 
funds. In addition, more explicit pricing of bank 
services should help all bank customers achieve 
a better balance between their use of each type of 
service and its cost to them. 
Of course, not all bank customers will benefit. 
Households making heavy use of services may 
find their net compensation reduced by the sub-
stitution of taxable, explicit returns for tax-free 
implicit yields on deposit balances, while service 
charges, which are not tax deductible, rise. To 
accommodate these customers, banks may con-
tinue to offer accounts paying little or no explicit 
interest and carrying reduced service charges to 
depositors whose balances are adequate to com-
pensate for their use of services. However, 
banks are not going to be able to allow customers 
whose demand deposits are small relative to the 
use of services to continue to be subsidized in 
this fashion, and these depositors will face a 
higher cost of banking. On balance, however, the 
movement toward explicit and full pricing of 
services and deposits should improve and ratio-
nalize the provision and use of banking services 
in this country. 
For banks, earnings will be affected by the 
balance between the cost of paying interest on 
the deposits and the rise in revenue from the 
explicit pricing of services. An important factor 
in this regard is the competitive environment; 
bank earnings could be reduced substantially if a 
fierce struggle for depositors' dollars develops, 
with excessive interest rates paid on demand 
balances or continued underpricing of services 
being used as "come-ons" to lure depositors 
from other institutions. But our recent experi-
ence with rates on Super NOW (negotiable order 
of withdrawal) and money market deposit ac-
counts indicates that after an introductory peri-
od, they have been kept about in line with 
potential returns to banks and thrifts. Therefore, 
as a generality, I think it reasonable to expect 
that interest paid on demand deposits and rates 
charged for services would reflect fairly quickly 
the underlying investment opportunities and 
costs of banks. 
Under these circumstances, banks that are 
now earning more on their investment of inter-
est-free deposits than they are incurring in unre-
covered costs to provide subsidized services 
would experience some downward pressure on 
earnings. The intensity of this pressure will de-
pend also on how rapidly deposit funds are 
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shifted into accounts paying explicit interest 
rates. Eventually, the bulk of all transaction 
funds likely would be held in such deposits. But 
initially, some holders may not take the trouble 
to change accounts, and some, as noted above, 
may prefer the combination of no interest and 
low service charges they now are receiving. The 
extent of the shifting will depend in part on the 
structure of the legislation—whether, for exam-
ple, the DIDC is empowered to put the proposed 
$2,500 floor on decontrolled balances at first— 
and on the marketing approach of the institu-
tions. 
The negative impact of demand deposit inter-
est on earnings will not be distributed equally 
across depository institutions. Thrift institutions, 
for example, have very few demand deposits, 
and they would welcome the opportunity that a 
lifting of the ceiling would give them to compete 
with banks for business deposits. Large, whole-
sale-type banks that do a sizable share of their 
business with more sophisticated corporations 
also may not feel much of an impact, since these 
corporations probably already are getting a mar-
ket return on their deposits. Rather the effect will 
be felt most keenly by small and medium-sized 
banks, and large retail branch systems—espe-
cially those with a disproportionate share of 
demand deposits from small and medium-sized 
businesses. It is impossible to estimate with any 
precision just how large this effect would be, and 
obviously it will vary quite a bit among banks, 
depending on the particular situation of the insti-
tution. But it does seem possible that some 
classes of banks could be affected considerably, 
at least until they have had time to make other 
adjustments in lending rates, service charges, 
and other fee income. 
As the entire spectrum of banks' revenues and 
costs adjusts over time to the new situation, the 
initial adverse effect on earnings should tend to 
diminish. Even in the absence of the initiative on 
demand deposit rates, many of these same ad-
justments probably would become necessary. 
Household transaction deposits already have 
been significantly deregulated and are slated for 
complete interest rate deregulation by 1986, and 
it has been evident for some time that careful 
cash management techniques have been spread-
ing to more and more businesses. Thus, whatev-
er earnings benefit banks are receiving from the 
prohibition of interest on demand deposits is 
rapidly eroding in any case. 
From a monetary policy perspective, the pay-
ment of interest on demand deposits could create 
more uncertainty with respect to formulating 
monetary targets and interpreting incoming in-
formation about money growth. The level and 
behavior of demand deposits relative to income 
and prices is likely to change as these deposits 
become more attractive vehicles for holding liq-
uid savings, rather than being used almost exclu-
sively for transaction purposes. With competi-
tive interest rates, some of the funds that are now 
normally shifted to close substitutes for demand 
deposits will remain in these accounts. At the 
same time, some of the balances now held in 
demand deposits solely to compensate banks for 
services received will be invested elsewhere as 
explicit charges are placed on these services. 
The uncertainties are likely to be greatest in 
the transition period, when deposit holders are 
adjusting their behavior to the availability of 
interest-earning accounts and explicit prices for 
services. The problem, however, is one of de-
gree, since we are already facing similar difficul-
ties with Ml, our measure of transaction money, 
as a result of the movement of household funds 
into NOW and Super NOW accounts. Moreover, 
by inducing the utilization of demand deposit 
substitutes and the spread of cash management 
techniques, the current regulatory framework 
has created its own problems for monetary poli-
cy, which the payment of interest on demand 
deposits would tend to reduce. The Federal 
Reserve has already had to accept and adjust to 
the need for increased flexibility when imple-
menting policy in a changing financial environ-
ment, and I feel confident that we could deal with 
the effects of the advent of interest on demand 
deposits as well. 
IMPLEMENTATION OF INTEREST ON 
DEMAND DEPOSITS 
Although the Federal Reserve Board shares the 
desire to permit interest to be paid on demand 
deposits, we do have some concerns about how 
this is to be implemented. Generally, we favor 
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the approach in H.R. 3895, which you introduced 
at the request of the DIDC. It is my understand-
ing, Mr. Chairman, that your own bill differs 
from the DIDC proposal in three respects. 
First, your bill would eliminate the current 
restrictions limiting thrift-institution checking ac-
counts for businesses to those with other cus-
tomer relationships. This action, it seems to us, 
is not appropriate at this time. Thrifts are still in 
the process of adapting their business strategies 
to the new powers they obtained only last De-
cember. The Federal Reserve believes that the 
question of a still broader scope for the checking 
account authority of thrifts should be addressed 
later on, when the wider issues concerning the 
structure and organization of the financial sys-
tem are considered. 
Second, we believe that the DIDC should have 
the authority to decontrol demand deposits in a 
fashion parallel with NOW accounts. As you 
know, NOW account interest rates are still regu-
lated for accounts of less than $2,500—a mini-
mum that will drop to $1,000 in January 1985 
before total elimination in the spring of 1986. If 
the same minimum were not imposed for inter-
est-bearing demand deposits, the DIDC would 
need to end the regulation of NOW accounts 
immediately, and probably also of savings ac-
counts. In the absence of such action, a sizable 
volume of funds in savings accounts and smaller 
NOW accounts would simply shift to deregulated 
demand deposits. The effect on the earnings of 
banks and thrifts could be substantial, and I 
would prefer to see the floor phased out as the 
DIDC has proposed. At thrift institutions in 
particular, the need to pay higher rates on $185 
billion of savings deposits could have very seri-
ous consequences on a still weakened industry. 
Finally, we would urge that the Federal Re-
serve be allowed to impose full transaction re-
serve requirements on increases in demand de-
posits at each institution from the date of 
enactment, as in the DIDC bill. This provision is 
necessitated by the nature of the phase-in of 
reserve requirements for nonmember banks and 
thrifts under the Monetary Control Act. The 
Congress directed that NOW accounts be subject 
to full transaction account reserve requirements 
immediately, while requirements on demand de-
posits would be brought up to the NOW account 
level only slowly. Decontrol of demand deposit 
interest rates would allow thrifts and nonmember 
banks to avoid full reserve requirements on 
household accounts for the remaining transition-
al years by transferring the funds already in 
NOW accounts to demand deposits. The result 
would impose an additional, unfair competitive 
disadvantage on member banks. 
Let me reiterate, Mr. Chairman, that our dis-
agreements are related to technical matters con-
cerning the precise way interest on demand 
deposits would be phased in—not to the funda-
mental intent of your bill, on which we are in 
agreement. 
INTEREST ON RESERVES 
In addition, the Board would urge that any 
legislation to eliminate the prohibition of interest 
on demand deposits include a plan to begin 
paying interest on required reserve balances at 
the Federal Reserve. The two steps are comple-
mentary—interest on reserves will reinforce 
some of the beneficial effects of allowing interest 
on demand deposits while alleviating some of the 
short-run impact on bank earnings. 
Reserve requirements serve a vital and effi-
cient role in the conduct of monetary policy; they 
are the fulcrum through which policy actions 
affecting reserve balances are transmitted to the 
depository institutions and through them to the 
general public. But it is not necessary that re-
serve balances be interest-free. In their present 
form, reserves act as a tax on the institutions 
forced to hold them, which, like any other tax, 
probably is partly absorbed by the institutions 
and partly passed on to the public in the form of 
lower deposit rates or higher service charges. 
Such a tax might be justifiable at a time when the 
government also was setting rate ceilings that 
held down the cost of deposits, but these ceilings 
will soon be gone. By enabling depository insti-
tutions to compete for savers' dollars on an equal 
footing with other intermediaries, payment of 
interest on required reserves could increase the 
flow of funds through banks and enable deposi-
tors to enjoy the maximum benefits of deposit 
rate deregulation. 
Federal Reserve Bulletin: November 1983Statements to Congress 851 
We recognize that there are some difficulties 
associated with the proposal that market interest 
rates be paid on such reserves. For example, 
movements in the monetary aggregates—espe-
cially the narrow transaction aggregate Ml— 
might become even more difficult to interpret if 
this substantial regulatory cost, which would 
tend to force interest rates to be lower on trans-
action accounts than on other deposits, is elimi-
nated. But by removing one more incentive for 
people to find new and innovative methods of 
avoiding holding reservable deposits, interest on 
reserves, along with interest on demand depos-
its, may in time contribute to a more stable 
financial environment and hence to greater ease 
in making monetary policy. 
Interest on reserves would also result in a loss 
of Treasury revenue. Currently, about $20 billion 
of reserve balances are held at the Federal Re-
serve, and with the System's portfolio yielding 
around 10 percent, this amount generates about 
$2 billion of revenues annually that are available 
to be remitted to the Treasury. Of course, a 
sizable part of any interest paid out to banks and 
thrifts would be recaptured through increased 
tax payments by those institutions and their 
depositors. Nonetheless, at a time when very 
large federal deficits seem in prospect for the 
indefinite future, the loss of revenues is a serious 
matter. 
To spread the fiscal effects of such a move, 
therefore, interest payments on reserve balances 
might be phased-in over a number of years. This 
could be done by gradually increasing the rate 
paid on reserve balances until it eventually 
reached its final level—perhaps keyed to the 
Federal Reserve's earnings on its portfolio of 
Treasury bills. Alternatively, full interest could 
be paid initially only on the reserves held against 
certain types of deposits, adding to the eligible 
classes of deposits over time. This would be 
consistent in its initial stages with the proposals 
now before the Congress to have the Federal 
Reserve pay interest on reserves held against 
money market deposit and Super NOW ac-
counts. Its disadvantage is the need to allocate 
reserve balances to deposit classes, and the 
arbitrary competitive handicap that deposits still 
subject to the reserve "tax" would incur until 
the phase-out is complete. 
BROKERED DEPOSITS 
You asked, Mr. Chairman, that I discuss possi-
ble regulatory approaches to dealing with prob-
lems that may arise in association with bank or 
thrift use of brokers to obtain deposits. As you 
know, Chairman Volcker already has responded 
to your request for suggestions on this subject, 
and I have attached his letter for reference.
1 
Briefly, our view is that deposit brokering has 
a legitimate role to play in our financial system. 
By channeling funds from areas in which they are 
in surplus to areas of relative shortage, money 
brokerage is but one of a number of similar 
activities that contribute to the efficient function-
ing of our financial markets. By and large, this 
works to the benefit of depositor, depository 
institutions, and the economy in general. 
At the same time, we recognize that deposit 
brokerage has been subject to abuse, particularly 
by troubled institutions that have been willing to 
pay large premiums for brokered funds to bolster 
their deposit base. Recently, this practice has 
been facilitated by the technique of placing large 
sums with a given institution and parceling them 
out in pieces of $100,000 or less, so that the 
holdings of each participating depositor are fed-
erally insured. As a result, any market discipline 
associated with risk is undermined, and the de-
posit insurance funds are faced with potentially 
much larger calls on their assets if the troubled 
institution subsequently fails. 
Since there is the possibility of abusing an 
implied fiduciary relationship between broker 
and deposit customer, it may be appropriate to 
require registration and regulations of such 
firms, perhaps along the lines of the Investment 
Advisers Act of 1940 already being administered 
by the Securities and Exchange Commission. 
The application of suitability standards and dis-
closure requirements similar to those in this act 
to deposit brokers could be quite beneficial. 
The most serious aspect of the problem, how-
ever, has been the use of brokered deposits by 
troubled institutions, which we believe can best 
be approached through closer supervision of the 
depository institutions themselves. The first re-
1. The attachments to this statement are available on 
request from Publications Services, Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System, Washington, D.C. 20551. 
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quirement is to identify institutions that are rely-
ing heavily on brokered deposits, or that have 
increased such reliance sharply over a short 
period of time. This finding would alert the 
primary supervisors of these institutions to the 
need for in-depth reviews to ascertain whether 
this practice indicated that the institution was 
facing fundamental problems, and to take reme-
dial action as warranted. 
Beginning with the quarterly call report for 
September 30, 1983, banks have been required to 
report the volume of deposits obtained through 
brokers. This requirement will make possible the 
monitoring of the amount and distribution of 
brokered funds and the identification of institu-
tions in which brokered deposits account for an 
unusual proportion of total funding. I would 
envisage a follow-up review of all such institu-
tions, probing in greater depth the sources, 
terms, and conditions of the brokerage arrange-
ments. It seems to me that such reports, along 
with on-site inspections when indicated, would 
enable supervisors to discover and take timely 
steps against any abusive practices that may be 
facilitated by the availability of brokered 
funds. • 
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